This paper presents a stochastic investment model for a defined benefit pension scheme, in the presence of IID real rates of return. The spread method of adjustment to the normal cost is used to deal with surpluses or deficiencies. Two types of risk are identified, the "contribution rate risk" and the "solvency risk" which are concerned with the stability of the contributions and the security of the pension fund, respectively. A performance criterion is introduced to deal with the simultaneous minimisation of these two risks, using the fraction of the unfunded liability paid off (k) or the spread period (M) as the control variable. A full numerical investigation of the optimal values of k and M is provided. The results lead to practical conclusions about the optimal funding strategy and, hence, about the optimal choice of the contribution rate subject to the constraints needed for the convergence of the performance criterion.
Introduction

Risk in a defined benefit pension scheme
As defined by Lee (1986) , occupational pension schemes are arrangements by means of which employers or groups of employers provide pensions and related benefits to their employees. We are interested in defined benefit pension schemes where the benefits promised are the defined quantity and the contributions are the dependent variable. The determination of these contributions takes place through the valuation process, which is performed by the actuary at regular intervals.
The method by which the scheme is valued and the contribution rate determined is called the actuarial funding method. In this paper, we shall consider the class of individual funding methods (which involve an actuarial liability and a normal cost). It is inevitable that the actual experience of the pension scheme will deviate from the assumptions (of demographic and economic variables) on which the previous valuation was based so that a surplus or a deficiency will emerge. In the light of the particular situation revealed by the valuation, appropriate action will be taken by way of an adjustment to the contribution rate so as to remove the shortfall or to utilise the surplus. For individual funding methods, the most common ways of dealing with this adjustment are the spread method and the amortisation of losses method. We will consider the spread method under which the unfunded liability is spread into the future over a certain period. The choice of this period, i.e. called the spread period, will be related to the required balance between the different types of risk facing the pension scheme.
We investigate two types of risk. The first one is the "contribution rate risk". According to Lee (1986) , the sponsor of the scheme will look for a contribution plan which will not be disturbed by significant changes so that the contribution rate will remain reasonably stable in the future. The second type of risk is the "solvency risk". As Lee (1986) explains, the trustees and the employees will be concerned that the accumulated assets represent reasonable security for the growing pension rights of the members, independently of the sponsoring employer, at any time or when the scheme is wound up. We note also that an excessive build-up of assets relative to liabilities (i.e. overfunding) can also have serious economic consequences, e.g. for the employer (Thornton and Wilson, 1992; Exley et al., 1997) . In this paper, we will use a mathematical model to represent the financial structure of a defined benefit pension scheme with stochastically varying investment returns. As noted by many commentators (e.g. Thornton and Wilson, 1992) one of the principal sources of surplus or deficiency for pension schemes has been the rate of investment return on the scheme assets. We will consider methods for controlling the above types of risk by using the spread period as our control variable. As noted by Owadally and Haberman (1999) , the spread period plays an important role in "the stochastic dynamics of the fund over time and careful consideration should be given to its choice".
Formulation of the problem
The approach described is based on the earlier investigations of Haberman (1997a,b) . The optimal contribution rate will be determined by minimising a quadratic performance criterion, that includes both the contribution rate risk and the solvency risk. The problem is described below using a discrete time formulation (as in Haberman and Sung (1994) ).
We wish to find the contribution rates C(s), C(s + 1), . . . , C(T − 1) over the finite time period (s, T ) which minimise the quadratic performance criterions s J T defined below. We use the following notation:
C(t) = contribution rate for the time period (t, t + 1). F (t) = fund level at time t, measured in terms of the market value of the assets.
CT(t) = contribution target for the period (t, t + 1). FT(t) = fund target for the period (t, t + 1)
. w = (1 + j) −1 for some j > 0, w is a discount factor used to weight the different contributions to the criterion J over time. θ = a weighting factor to reflect the relative importance of the solvency risk against the contribution rate risk. Then we define s J T as
θ(C(t) − CT(t)) 2 + (1 − θ )(F (t) − FT(t))
The first term provides a measure of the contribution rate risk and the second term the solvency risk. The quadratic nature of (1) means that high values of C(t) (relative to the target) are considered to be as undesirable as low values, and similarly for F (t). This characteristic is justified on the grounds that we seek to penalise instabilities in C(t) as well as either underfunding or overfunding of the liabilities (as noted in Section 1.1).
The expectation operator is necessary because we are interested in the stochastic case so as to recognise the random nature of investment returns. (In a continuous time formulation, the mathematical approach would be based on an integral version of (1).)
The actuarial funding methods would normally specify appropriate values for CT(t) and FT(t) in order to control the pace of funding. Here, we choose CT(t) = EC(t) and FT(t) = EF(t) as appropriate target values. So, Eq. (1) becomes
Thus, the risk of the pension fund is defined as a "time-weighted" sum of the weighted average of the future variances of the fund level and contribution rate. θ is determined according to which of the variability of the fund or the contribution is more important for the employer. This balance will influence the choice of the funding strategy, since some methods (e.g. prospective benefit methods) aim more at stabilising the contribution rate, whereas others (e.g. accrued benefit methods) have as their main purpose the funding of the actuarial liability. w = (1 + j) −1 is used to discount the variances. A low value of w (high value of j ) indicates that more emphasis is placed on the shorter-term position of the pension fund rather than the longer term, thereby providing a mechanism for weighting in time. We will comment in places on the special case, j = i, so that w = v = (1 + i) −1 , where i is the valuation rate of interest.
The mathematical problem
We consider the behaviour of C(t) by using a stochastic investment model of a defined benefit pension scheme. Its main features are a stationary population and independent and identically distributed rates of return. As noted earlier, we shall work in discrete time (t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ).
When an actuarial valuation takes place, the actuary estimates C(t) and F (t) based only on the active and retired members of the scheme at time t under the following assumptions:
• The valuation interest rate is fixed and is i (but see assumption (4) below).
• The contribution income and benefit outgo cash flows occur at the start of each scheme year.
• Valuations are carried out at annual intervals.
The following recurrence relations for the pension fund's assets and the actuarial liability hold:
for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , based on the following notation: i(t + 1)=rate of investment return earned during the period (t, t + 1), defined in a manner consistent with the definition of F (t) (but see assumption (4) below). AL(t + 1) = actuarial liability at the end of the period (t, t + 1) with respect to the active and retired members. B(t) = overall benefit outgo for the period (t, t + 1). NC(t) = normal cost for the period (t, t + 1). We make the following further simplifying assumptions: 1. The experience is in accordance with all the features of the actuarial basis, except for investment returns. 2. The population is stationary from the start. We could alternatively assume that the population is growing at a fixed, deterministic rate. 3. There is no promotional salary scale. Salaries increase at a deterministic rate of inflation. This inflation component is used to reduce the assumed rate of investment return to give a real rate of investment return. We also assume that benefits in payment increase at the same rate as salaries and then consider all variables to be in real terms (i.e.
AL(t), B(t), NC(t), F (t), C(t)).
Following the previous assumption, i(t +1) is the real rate of investment return earned during the period (t, t +1)
and E i(t) = i, where i is the real valuation rate of interest. This means that funds are assumed in the valuation to be invested in future to earn the mean rate of investment return. We also define σ 2 = Var(i(t)) and assume σ 2 < ∞. 5. The earned real rates of return i(t) are independent identically distributed random variables with Prob(i(t) > −1) = 1. 6. The initial value of the fund at time zero is known, i.e. Prob[F (0) = F 0 ] = 1 for some F 0 .
Assumptions 1-3 imply that the following parameters are constant with respect to time t (after dividing all monetary amounts relating to time t by Π(1 + I (s)), where I (s) is the rate of salary inflation during the period (s, s + 1)):
Then, combining these results with (4), we obtain
Individual funding methods
For an individual funding method, the unfunded liability denotes the difference between the plan's actuarial liability and its assets.
where UL(t) is the unfunded liability at time t. These methods involve an actuarial liability and a normal cost which is then adjusted to deal with the unfunded liability. There are a number of choices for the ADJ(t) term. We will consider the spread method, under which
where ADJ(t) is the adjustment to the contribution rate at time
is calculated at the valuation rate of interest, M is the "spread period".
So the unfunded liability is spread over M years and k can be thought of as a penalty rate of interest that is being charged on the unfunded liability. The choice of M, as we will see later on, is of great importance and influences the funding strategy.
The above definition of ADJ(t) implies that the spread period is always the same whether there is a surplus or a deficit. According to Winklevoss (1993) , this may not always be the case in practice with a shorter spread period being used to eliminate deficiencies than for surpluses. (This asymmetric approach has recently been investigated by Haberman and Smith (1997) using simulation.) Finally, from (6)-(8) and the previous assumptions Dufresne (1988) has shown that, given our mathematical formulation,
Moments of C(t) and F (t)
where
and
Dufresne also proves that
, and that
provided a < 1, i.e.
(1 − k) 2 (1 + i) 2 (1 + σ 2 v 2 ) < 1 which places restrictions either on the choice of σ 2 or on the choice of the spread period (see Sections 1.6 and 2.2).
The general form
If we substitute T = ∞, s = 0 in (2), then we use the simplified notation J ∞ :
From Eq. (13), we then obtain
For the case F 0 = AL, Eqs. (10), (12) and (16) lead to
where z = F 0 − AL and w = 1/(1 + j) = v, and providing that w < 1, wq < 1 and wq 2 < 1. As noted above, q < 1 and w < 1 so that these conditions are satisfied.
Our aim is to find the value(s) of k (or equivalently the spread period, as k = 1/ä ¬ M ) which minimises the above equation. Then, we can find the optimal C(t) via Eq. (9).
We note that q = (1+i)(1−k) ⇒ k = 1−qv and a = q 2 (1+σ 2 v 2 ) and since q → k is a 1:1 mapping with domain (0,1) and image set (d, 1), it is convenient to reparametrise J ∞ in terms of q. We write
, where
Thus, we need to solve dg(q)/dq = 0 in order to find the optimal values of q. g(q) is a ratio of two polynomials of degree 5. It is a complex function of q and may have a number of turning points, both minima and maxima. The solution of (18) reduces to find the roots of a polynomial of degree 8. It is clear from the form of g(q) that its graph has three vertical asymptotes, i.e. g(q) → ±∞, when q → q i for i = 1, 2, 3, where
Given that w < 1 we have that q 1 > q 2 > q 3 . In order to ensure that the limiting variances of F (t) and C(t) are finite (as given by (14)), we will restrict our attention to the range of values (0, q max ), where q max is such that a = 1. Thus
and we only consider q < q max . We note also that q max < q 3 , so that the above mentioned asymptotes fall outside of the range of values of q that is of interest in this analysis.
Risk as a time-weighted mechanism
Introduction
We wish to solve Eq. (18) and find the values of q at which J ∞ is minimised. For all the calculations, we assume for convenience (and without loss of generality) that AL = 1. As noted above, solutions are restricted to values such that
We verify that the chosen values of q are the minimum points by detailed numerical calculations, and demonstrate some of the results by the relevant graphs of J ∞ plotted against q. The results indicate that, in some cases, there is a single global minimum and, in others, there is a global minimum and a local minimum. It is also possible that, in some cases, the minimum value of J ∞ confined to the range (0, q max ) occurs at one of the endpoints.
In any particular case, calculation of the minimising value(s) of q allows us to find the corresponding values of k and M from
The tables in Section 2.3 onwards provide the optimal values of k and M as a function of i, σ , j , z and θ (to the nearest integer) and the values of k and M which are marked with † correspond to the minimum value of J occurring at q max . Detailed investigations have been carried out for a range of values of z and θ but detailed results are reported here only for the cases z = −AL, − 1 2 AL and 0 and selected values of θ .
The maximum feasible values of the spread period
As noted earlier, the requirement a < 1 (for convergence) places a restriction on the choice of q. So the optimal values of q must be restricted to values such that q < q max . Table 1 provides rounded values of the maximum spread period M 1 which correspond to q max for different combinations of σ and i and indicates the extent to which M 1 decreases as σ and i each increase. Similarly, there is a minimum value of k, k 1 corresponding to q max and M 1 .
Initial funding level of 0%
Tables 2-6 provide the optimal values of k and the spread period M for F 0 = 0 (i.e. z = −1) and selected combinations of σ, i, j and θ, corresponding to the global and local minima of g(q) as appropriate. The top panel of each table presents the global minima and the bottom panel the local minima.
Tables 2-6 (and other results not tabulated here for reasons of space) indicate that: 1. There is a value of k or M (k * and M * , respectively) which leads to a global minimum in J ∞ (and hence g(q)). 2. For certain combinations of θ and σ (see below), there is a local minimum for J ∞ . 3. When σ is small, M * is very large and equal to its maximum permitted value, so that a < 1, M 1 . Similarly k * is close to its minimum permitted value k 1 , so that a < 1. 4. As σ is increased, there is a dramatic change in the optimal values with M * decreasing and k * increasing. For example, we note that when i = 1%, j = 1% and θ = 0, M * = 318.1 and k * = 0.0103 when σ = 0.03, but for σ ≥ 0.05, M * = 1.01 and k * = 0.9900. For the permitted range of values of M or k, J ∞ has a turning point but the choice of the location of the global minimum depends on the relationship between the value of J ∞ at the turning point and at the boundary values M 1 or k 1 .
For small σ , the global minimum occurs at M 1 or k 1 (i.e. to make M as large as possible, or k as small as possible). As σ is increased further the shape of J ∞ changes, so that there is only one minimum point.
We have noted in Section 2.2, that when σ increases, M 1 decreases and k 1 increases. Further analysis shows that there is a critical value of σ,σ for which J ∞ has a minimum at the two points M 2 M 3 (and k 2 k 3 ), where k 3 Table 3 Optimal values of k * and M * : when and M 3 are determined by
so that M 3 is the maximum feasible value for the spread period corresponding toσ and k 3 is the corresponding minimum feasible value for k.
, J ∞ is higher than at either of the end points of this interval. So when the choice of σ makes M 1 < M 3 (i.e. σ >σ ), J ∞ is only minimised at M 2 . When M is allowed to exceed M 3 , J ∞ decreases. Hence, when the choice of σ makes M 1 > M 3 (σ <σ ), the optimal choice becomes M 1 .
Approximate values ofσ for different values of j, θ and i are shown in Table 7 . We note the dependence ofσ on these parameters. Table 5 Optimal values of k * and M * : when F 0 = 0, i = 5%, j = 3% 
Tables 2-6 also indicate that for σ <σ , this optimal choice of M or k does not depend on θ as neither M 1 nor k 1 depends on θ. On the other hand, for σ >σ , an increase in θ has a dramatic effect on M * and k * . For example, when i = 1%, j = 1% and σ = 0.05, the optimal spread period M * = 1.64 (with k * = 0.6103) for θ = 0.5, but M * = 222.8 (and k * = 0.0111) for θ = 0.85.
The results thus indicate that, for σ large enough, there is a minimising value of M * or k * . If σ is small, then there are two minima and the global minimum corresponds to the choice M 1 and k 1 , where k 1 is close to d. We can interpret this feature as follows: if F 0 = 0 and k is chosen to be equal to d, then from (10), r = 0 and EF(t) = 0 for all t and from (12),
Thus, we would be operating a pay-as-you-go system with So, the case where σ is small leads to a funding policy with a very small fund and the sponsor paying the interest on the unfunded liability in addition to NC. So the analysis implies the existence of two possible funding positions, with the combination of parameters determining which is optimal. A funding policy based on a high value for M * (low value of k * ) would aim at keeping the contributions stable by ignoring positive or negative fluctuations in investment returns and hence in F (t). This would work in the short term (i.e. small values of t) but, in due course, the level of F (t) would need to be taken into account and the fluctuations in fund size will require compensating changes in C(t) to control the system. On the other hand, a funding policy based on a value of M * close to 1 (and k * close to 1) implies dealing immediately with any surplus or deficiencies as they emerge. Thus, the resulting C(t) will be volatile in the short term but in the long term the relative stability of F (t) will compensate and lead to lower values of Var C(t) (Dufresne, 1988; Cairns and Parker, 1997; Owadally and Haberman, 1999) . The balance between these two extremes will depend on the value of σ, j (representing the relative weight to be given to the short term versus the long term in the overall measure J ∞ ) and θ (representing the relative weight to be given to fund stability and contribution stability).
We next consider Eq. (17) as a function of θ, 0 < θ < 1. We recall that θ controls the balance between the solvency risk and the contribution rate risk. The risk (as represented by J ∞ ) is a decreasing function of θ :
but this decrease in risk is significant only for large values of q (i.e. large values of M or small values of k). So, when θ increases, the risk decreases but this downward shift in risk is not smooth. J ∞ decreases markedly when M is large (k is small) and remains approximately constant when M is small (k is large), thereby, making the optimal spread period M * larger (and k * smaller). Tables 3-6 indicate that for σ <σ , when a higher discounting factor, w, is used (a lower j ) the optimal choices M * and k * remain the same (equal to M 1 and k 1 , respectively). This is explained as neither M 1 nor k 1 depends on j . On the other hand, for σ >σ , we observe that the optimal choice M * becomes smaller (and k * larger) when j is decreased. For example, when σ = 0.15, θ = 0.75 and i = 3%, M * = 45.8 and k * = 0.0202 when j = 5%, but M * = 2.46 and k * = 0.4034 when j = 3%. Fig. 1 shows the graph of J ∞ for the corresponding case when θ = 0.25.
We observe that when j rises, the risk as represented by J ∞ decreases, with less weight being given to the elements of formula (15) corresponding to higher values of t. This downward shift in risk is much more significant for large values of M, making the optimal spread period longer. Hence, when j = 3% the risk J ∞ is minimised for M ∼ = 1. When j = 5% (more emphasis is placed on the shorter-term state of the pension fund), the risk remains approximately the same for M ∼ = 1 but decreases considerably for M ∼ = 46 and the optimal spread period becomes M * ∼ = 46 (= M 1 ).
We can explain these results in a different way. We consider Eq. (17) as a function of j and choose for convenience the particular parameter values i = 3%, σ = 0.15 and θ = 0.25. Fig. 2 shows the graph of this function for different values of M, selected carefully in the light of the earlier results. Fig. 2 demonstrates what we have already claimed. The risk as represented by J ∞ is a decreasing function of j and this decrease in risk becomes more significant as the values of M become larger.
From Tables 2-6 , it can also be seen that an increase in the assumed rate of return i causes a significant decrease in M * when σ <σ and a slight decrease in M * when σ >σ . We recall that when σ <σ , the optimal choice is M 1 which depends on i, and which changes in the way shown by Table 1 . When σ >σ , the optimal choice for M is smaller (and for k is longer) and remains the same or decreases slightly (or increases for k) when i increases. For example, when j = 5%, θ = 1 and σ = 0.35, M * = 14.4 and k * = 0.0660 for i = 3% but M * = 12.4 and k * = 0.0693 for i = 5%. Fig. 3 illustrates these two cases. Fig. 3 shows that J ∞ remains approximately the same for low values of M and slightly increases for high values of M when i is increased.
We consider Eq. (17) as a function of i and choose for convenience the particular parameter values, σ = 0.35, θ = 1 and j = 5%. Fig. 4 shows this function for different values of M. Fig. 4 demonstrates the sensitivity of J ∞ to changes in i, indicating that the optimal choice is influenced only slightly when the assumed rate of return changes. It also indicates that for the case when the rate of interest used for discounting (j ) is equal to the valuation rate of interest i (see Tables 2, 3 and 6), the changes in J ∞ are principally attributable to changes in the discounting rate of interest.
Initial funding level of 25%
The detailed results for this case of F 0 = 0.25 (z = −0.75) are not presented here. However, these show that, for a higher initial funding level, the optimal choice for M, spread period is much lower (and much higher for k) for many combinations of σ, i, j and θ. For example, when i = 1%, j = 1%, σ = 0.01 and θ = 0 the optimal choice is M * = 535.0 and k * = 0.0099 when F 0 = 0, and M * = 1.01 and k * = 0.9925 when F 0 = 0.25. The initial funding level of 25% leads to a shorter optimal choice of spread period M * (and larger value of k * ) when the other parameters are such that we do not have the case of M 1 . For example, for the combination of j = 10%, i = 5%, σ = 0.01, the higher initial funding level of 25% is not sufficient to change the optimal choice which remains M * = 143.6 and k * = 0.0099. Hence, for this case, the effect of the high value of j is more significant than the magnitude of the initial funding level.
When the optimal spread period is shorter than M 1 (σ >σ ), an increase in j leads to a higher optimal choice. For example, when i = 5%, θ = 0.25 and σ = 0.01, M * = 1.01 for j = 5% but M * = 143.6 for j = 10%. Fig. 5 shows J ∞ plotted against M. Fig. 5 illustrates what we have already claimed. The risk as represented by J ∞ is a decreasing function of j and is more sensitive to changes in j for the higher values of M (see also Fig. 2) , and the correspondingly lower values of k. Therefore, when we are more interested in the shorter-term position of the pension fund (j = 10%), the risk decreases to a greater extent for M ∼ = 144 than for M ∼ = 1 and the optimal spread period becomes M * = 143.6.
For an initial funding level of 25% and for the σ >σ cases, the detailed results show that an increase in the assumed rate of return leads to the same results as for a zero initial funding level. The optimal choice for M does not change or decreases slightly. Therefore, when the valuation rate of interest i is equal to the rate of interest used in discounting, j , changes in M and k are principally in response to changes in j .
As for the case F 0 = 0, the results show that the increase in θ causes a significant change in the optimal choices for M and k. The reason for this change has already been discussed. The risk as represented by J ∞ is a decreasing function of θ and the level of this decrease is considerable only for the case of high M (or low k). Therefore, when θ increases, the risk decreases for high values of M (low values of k) and the optimal choice becomes larger for M (and lower for k). For example, when i = 1% and σ = 0.01, M * = 1.01 for θ = 0, but M * = 535.0 for θ = 1. Table 8 presents the critical values ofσ (where they exist) for certain combinations of parameters. The dependence ofσ on these parameters is clear.
Initial funding level of 50%
Tables 9-13 provide the optimal values of k and M for F 0 = 0.50 (z = −0.50) and selected combinations of θ, σ, j and i, corresponding to the global and local minimum of g(q) as appropriate.
The results presented by Tables 9-13 show less dramatic variation than the corresponding results in Section 2.3: this arises because of the higher initial funding level. For low values of θ, we observe that the optimal choice of M is not affected by changes in σ, i or j . For example, when θ = 0.5, M * ∼ = 2 and k lies in the range (0.581, 0.646) for each value of i, j and σ investigated. When θ increases (except for the cases of θ = 0.95 and θ = 1), the optimal choice for M increases slightly and for k decreases. Given the initial funding level of 50%, changes in j and/or σ do not cause any dramatic change in M * or k * . Similarly the range of the optimal values is reduced relative to the earlier cases of F 0 = 0 or F 0 = 0.25.
For higher values of θ (θ = 0.95 or θ = 1) and when σ >σ , an increase in j leads to a higher optimal choice for M (and a lower choice for k). For example, when i = 5%, θ = 0.95 and σ = 0.1, M * = 5.15 and k * = 0.1833 for j = 3%, M * = 6.03 and k * = 0.1547 for j = 5% but M * = 51.1 and k * = 0.0144 (not tabulated) for j = 10%. When σ <σ , a change in value of j does not cause any changes in M * (= M 1 for these cases) unlike the assumed rate of return which affects the optimal choice (as noted earlier). So, when i increases, the maximum feasible spread period decreases, as can be seen from Table 1 . For σ >σ , M * does not change markedly in response to changes in i. Hence, in the case of i = j (see Tables 9, 10 and 13), the optimal choice is principally affected by j . Table 14 shows the values ofσ (where they exist) for combinations of i, j and θ (=0.95 and 1.0). 
Initial funding level of 75%
As in Section 2.4, the detailed results for this case of F 0 = 0.75 (z = −0.25) are not presented here.
With an initial funding level of 75%, the results are similar to those for 50% funding. Except for the case of θ = 1, an increase in j and/or in θ does not cause any dramatic change in M * for all values of σ . The effect of the valuation rate of interest i on M * is also of minor significance (except for the case of θ = 1).
When θ = 1, the results do indicate some dramatic changes in M * . For example, when σ = 0.01, M * = 43.8 and k * = 0.0211 for i = 3% and j = 1% and M * = 535.0 and k * = 0.0099 for i = 1% and j = 1%. The higher initial funding level, means that the effect of the valuation rate of interest is more significant than for lower initial funding levels. This is also illustrated in Fig. 6 which presents the variation of J ∞ viewed as a function of i. When θ increases, the results show that the optimal choice increases. When θ = 1, for low values of σ , the risk is minimised when M * = M 1 . For higher values of σ , the optimal choice for M decreases and for k increases. Table 15 indicates the critical values ofσ when θ = 1.
It is clear that the influence of the high initial funding level is more significant than any of the other parameters, making the optimal choice shorter for most cases, when compared with the F 0 = 0 and F 0 = 0.50 cases discussed earlier. We also observe that the higher is the initial funding level, the lower is the value ofσ (see Tables 7, 8, 14 and 15). 
Initial funding level of 100%
Tables 16-20 provide the optimal values of k and M * when F 0 = 1 and for selected combinations of θ, σ, j and i. We note in this case, that there is only a global minimum for g (q) .
When the initial unfunded liability is zero, a different value of the interest rate (j ) used for discounting does not lead to a markedly different optimal choice for k or M -except for the case of θ = 1. From Tables 16-20, it can be seen that, for low values of θ , the results for k and M depend little on σ , i or j . For example, when θ = 0.5, M * lies in the range (1.52, 1.63) and k * in the range (0.6134, 0.6511) for the values of σ, i and j investigated.
When θ increases, there is a slight increase in the optimal choice for M, as for the other cases discussed in Sections 2.3-2.6. When we are only concerned with stabilising the contribution rate (θ = 1), the optimal choice Table 16 Optimal values of k * and M * : when F 0 = AL, i = 1%, j = 1% for M, as previously, is as large as possible. Therefore, for σ <σ , M * = M 1 which decreases when i rises but remains the same when j changes. For σ >σ M * is shorter. Given the initial funding level of 100%, the optimal spread period is more sensitive to changes in the valuation rate of interest. For example, when σ = 0.01, j = 3% and θ = 1, M * = 26.3 and k * = 0.0288 for i = 5%, but M * = 218.5 and k * = 0.0099 for i = 3%. Therefore, when the valuation rate of interest i is equal to the rate of interest used in the discounting term j (see Tables 16, 17 and 20), changes in the optimal choice are attributable to changes in i. For the specific cases tabulated, when θ = 1, i = 3% and j = 5%,σ = 0.21.
Further comments
Minimising the solvency risk
If θ = 0, we are minimising the solvency risk. The degree of security will depend on the speed with which the shortfall is removed by means of special contributions. In this case, the best course of action would be to pay the full amount of the shortfall as it arises without spreading any payments into the future (i.e. M * = 1, k * = 1). But this may not always be attractive, or even possible, from the sponsoring employer's point of view.
However, Tables 2-6 show that when the initial assets are much less than the initial liability (e.g. F 0 = 0), the optimal spread period is much longer, especially, for low values of σ . In particular, for σ <σ , the optimal choice is the maximum feasible spread period M 1 which decreases as the mean return i increases. When σ >σ , the optimal spread period is approximately equal to 1 (and k * ∼ = 1), for all values investigated for the parameters i, j and z.
The results of Sections 2.5 and 2.7 show that as F 0 is increased, the optimal choices for minimising the solvency risk are M * ∼ = 1 and k * ∼ = 1.
Minimising the contribution rate risk
If θ = 1, we are minimising the contribution rate risk. We are concerned with stabilising the contribution rate by spreading the unfunded liability over as long a period as possible. Stable contributions enable the employer to plan more effectively future cash flows. Therefore, in order to make the call on the employer's resources more stable, the actuary should choose the period for the extinguishing of the unfunded liability to be as long as possible (and making the corresponding value of k as small as possible), otherwise the range of variation of the contribution rates is increased.
The length of the spread period decreases as σ increases. For σ <σ , the optimal choice is M 1 . For σ >σ , M * becomes shorter (and k * larger) according to the particular combinations of i, j and z. When the initial funding level (represented by z) decreases, the contribution rate required rises. If our objective is one of minimising the contribution rate risk, then the optimal spread period increases, M * , and the optimal choice of k decreases.
For the σ <σ cases, the optimal choice M * = M 1 does not change whatever the value of the interest rate used in the discounting process (M 1 does not depend on j ). For σ >σ , a higher value of j leads to a longer optimal choice for M * (and a lower value for k * ). An increase in j means that greater emphasis is being placed on the shorter-term state of the pension fund. For the case of an initial funding deficit (low value of F 0 ), this means that a higher adjustment to the contribution rate is required. If we are concerned with minimising the contribution rate risk, a higher value of M * should be chosen (or lower value of k * ) so as to reduce the variation in the contribution rate. The higher is the initial funding deficit, the greater is the impact of j on the optimal choice.
The results are also sensitive to changes in the interest rate (i). The optimal choice M * decreases (and k * increases) when i increases for each value of σ . For σ <σ , the changes in M * arising from changes in i correspond to Table 1 . For the σ >σ cases, the extent to which the results are affected by changes in the investment assumption depends on the initial level of assets. If the pension fund had no assets initially (F 0 = 0), the impact on M * and k * would be less. If the initial funding level were high, an increase in i would lead to a greater level of interest income obtained on the assets and consequently to a lower contribution and a smaller M * . Hence, increasing i has a larger impact on the optimal choice, M * , when the initial funding level as represented by z is high. Dufresne (1988) considers the trade-off between the limiting variances of the contribution rate risk and of the fund level, recognising that improved security may imply regularly adjusted contribution rates and, conversely, stable contribution rates may be achieved by a greater variation in the fund level. He minimises the ultimate level of these variances and finds a region for M (1, M * ), where
and y = (1 + i) 2 + σ 2 . He calls this region an optimal one, in the sense that, for M > M * , both limiting variances increase with increasing M and, for M ≤ M * , the limiting variance of the contribution rate risk decreases and the limiting variance of the fund level increases with increasing M. (We note that this line of research has been taken further by Cairns and Parker (1997) and Owadally and Haberman (1999) .) Therefore, we may consider as a measure of the contribution rate risk the variance of C(t) in the limit, i.e. Var C(∞). We recall Eq. (14):
. Dufresne (1988) shows that k * (as defined by Eq. (19)) is the value for which
According to our formulation, for θ = 1, the contribution rate risk is defined as J ∞ = ∞ t=0 w t Var C(t), where w is the discounting factor and Var C(t) = k 2 Var F (t). So
Hence, we must find the values of k for which J ∞ or
is minimised. We consider the case of z = −AL for convenience. Fig. 7 shows that the spread period M which minimises J ∞ is longer than the spread period which Dufresne defines as the optimal choice for minimising Var C. In our formulation of the problem, the criterion of minimising the contribution rate risk is defined as a time-weighted sum of the Var C(t). Hence, the discounting factor is the weight applied to the variance which means that for j > 0 (w < 1), more emphasis is placed on the shorter-term variances. On the other hand, minimising Var C(∞) means that we consider only the ultimate situation (t → ∞).
We note also, that in the special case where z = 0, so that F 0 = AL, (20) simplifies to
which, in a similar vein to Dufresne's result (19) , has a minimum at k = 1 − 1/wy.
Minimising the risk: the general case (0 < θ < 1)
Complete security or complete stability is not always an over-riding principle (0 < θ < 1). In this more general case, it is necessary to consider how quickly a particular contribution arrangement would meet the underlying pension scheme liability, in order to build up the security of the benefits.
We note that typically Var F (t) is much larger that Var C(t) (for M > 1 or k < 1). Thus, the discussion of Section 1.5 and Eq. (11) demonstrate that Var C(t) = k 2 Var F (t). This means that the most interesting values of θ lie in the range (0.9, 1). The results in Sections 2.3-2.7 bear out this feature, showing a relative insensitivity to the value of θ when θ is below 0.9.
An alternative formulation based on scaling Var F (t) (e.g. by AL 2 ) and Var C(t) (e.g. by NC 2 ) leads to a similar problem in that the latter is then much larger than the former for low values of M.
Whenσ exists, we observe that, for σ <σ , the optimal choice is M 1 , so that we want to spread the unfunded liability for as long as possible. For σ >σ , M * is much shorter and depends on the particular combinations of i, j, z and θ .
From the tables in Section 2 it can be seen that, when θ increases, the optimal spread period increases (and the optimal choice of k decreases) because we are more concerned with the criterion of stability. The sensitivity of the risk to θ depends on the particular values of the other parameters. Tables 2-6 indicate that, for low values of σ , the optimal choice (= M 1 ) is independent of θ (F 0 = 0). Table 10 shows that M * increases and k * decreases when θ increases for each value of θ (F 0 = 0.50). Table 17 and unpublished tables for the cases F 0 = 0.25 and F 0 = 0.75 show similar features.
When the initial funding level (F 0 ) rises, the risk as represented by J ∞ is minimised for shorter spread periods. We consider Eq. (17) as a function of z, −AL ≤ z ≤ 0. J ∞ is an increasing function of z and is more sensitive to changes in z for high values of q (i.e. high values of M and low values of k). For low values of q, the risk is approximately constant. So, when the initial funding level rises, the risk J ∞ remains approximately constant for low values of M, but it increases to a substantial extent for high values of M. With the objective of minimising the risk J ∞ , the optimal spread period becomes shorter. The extent to which the optimal choice is decreased, when the initial funding level rises, depends on the particular combination of the other parameters. From a comparison of the results (see, e.g. Tables 4 and 11), it can be observed that, for low values of σ , a lower initial funding level makes the optimal spread period jump from a low value to become equal to the maximum feasible spread period M 1 . For higher values of σ , the effect of the initial funding level is of lesser significance. The higher is the initial level of assets, the greater is the impact of the assumed rate of return (i) on the optimal choice. Because of the interest earned on the plan's high initial funding level, the criterion of security is satisfied when a small spread period is chosen, without leading to variations in contribution rate. Hence, the values of the optimal period range from 1.5 to 5.1 (and k * ranges from 0.1936 to 0.6459) when z = 0, as Tables 16-20 indicate for the range of parameters investigated.
We note that, in the special case where z = 0, the form of g(q) simplifies to
a ratio of two polynomials of degree 2 in q. The solution of (d/dq)g(q) = 0 then becomes the simpler matter of solving a quadratic equation in q.
With the objective of placing more emphasis on the shorter-term state of the pension fund (a higher value of j ), the results become more dependent on j , the lower is the initial funding level and for σ >σ (for σ <σ , M * = M 1 which is independent of j ). When the short-term state of the pension fund is to be emphasised and a large initial unfunded liability exists, minimisation of the risk J ∞ can be achieved by small changes to the contribution rate. This means that longer spread periods (and smaller values of k) should be chosen, as illustrated by Tables 4 and 6.
Conclusions
From the results in Section 2, it is clearly seen that, the lower is the initial funding level (F 0 ), the greater is the range of the optimal choices. Hence, when the funding strategy involves a low initial funding level, a high choice for M (or a low choice for k) is necessary (under particular choices of the other parameters) in order to remove the initial funding deficit while limiting the variation in the contribution rate.
The choice of the parameter θ is of great importance as it reflects which of the variability of the fund or of the contribution is required to be more stable from the employer's point of view. The results are presented for different values of θ and allow a comparison of the optimal choices for valuation methods with different principal objectives (e.g. more emphasis on stable contribution rates or on funding of the actuarial liability).
The use of a discounting factor w = v clarifies the effect of the assumed rate of return (i) and of the rate of interest for discounting variances (j ) on the range of the optimal spread periods. The results support the conclusion that, the greater is the departure from a 100% initial funding level, the less is the effect of the assumed rate of return. Given a high initial funding level, an alteration of the assumed rate of return does have an important effect on the range of the optimal spread periods. In particular, the interest earned on the pension plan's assets leads to a small range of optimal choices.
The rate of return used in the discounting process (j ) indicates which of the short-term or the long-term state of the pension fund is to be more emphasised. The conclusion is that the lower is the initial funding level, the greater is the impact of j on the range of the optimal choices. We also demonstrate that in the long term, the risk as represented by J ∞ is independent of the initial funding level and the range of the optimal choices for M and k is much diminished.
Finally, it is seen that, the range of the optimal spread periods is large for particular combinations of the parameters. For these cases and for low values of σ , the optimal choice is to make M as large as possible (and k as small as possible), effectively leading to a pay-as-you-go solution, as discussed in Section 2.3. The critical values of σ , which make the optimal spread period jump from a low value to the maximum feasible spread period M 1 , are shown in Section 2.
It is worth noting that, in UK, the values of the spread period used from most pension schemes in practice may be different from what the tables in Section 2 indicate. As far as the solvency risk is concerned, the minimum funding requirement (MFR) rules, as given in Guidance Note (1998), place a restriction on the choice of M.
In particular, if the funding level (which is defined as the ratio between the values of assets and liabilities under a prescribed set of assumptions) is less than 90%, the deficit has to be eliminated within 1 year. If the funding level is more than 90%, the unfunded liability has to be removed within 5 years. When F 0 = 0 and σ <σ , Tables 2-6 show that the spread period which minimises the risk J ∞ is longer than would be allowed by the MFR rules. For all the other cases tabulated, the results presented in Section 2 are consistent with MFR rules.
In UK, the values of M chosen in practice are unlikely to be greater than the average remaining membership period -with an average age of membership of 40-45 and a normal retirement age of 65 the choice of M would be in the range 20-25. This suggests that the optimal spread periods presented in Section 2, for σ <σ , are too long to be used in practice. However, it would be possible to investigate the behaviour of J ∞ restricting the range of M to, say, the interval 1-25 years: with such a constraint, the results for σ <σ could be markedly different from Section 2. Thus, Fig. 1 would imply M * ∼ = 1 and Fig. 5 would imply M * ∼ = 25 for the combinations of parameters depicted for the cases where σ <σ . The results of this paper suggest that, for σ <σ , if we are interested in minimising the risk J ∞ , values of M which are much smaller than this indicative range 20-25 (traditionally chosen by practitioners) would be optimal. These conclusions are in line with those of Dufresne (1988) and Owadally and Haberman (1999) , in relation to gains and losses arising from investment return fluctuations, and those of Kryvicky (1981) in relation to gains and losses arising from benefits amendments.
As noted earlier, the relative magnitudes of the variances of F (t) and C(t) mean that only a narrow range of θ is of practical interest. An alternative formulation would be to return to the performance criterion and allow a choice of non-negative weights without the restriction of their having to sum to 1, e.g. At a more general level, the problem as formulated requires an initial choice of M (or k) to be made and to be permanently maintained thereafter, irrespective of the information available. Although many practitioners use a fixed value of M, an alternative, less restrictive and possibly superior approach would be to relate k to the information as it develops over time: this is the subject of current investigation.
